Weband Tirole, 2010; Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2013; Masulis and Reza, 2014) and hence problematic (“agency view”). That is to say, socially responsible firms tend to suffer from agency problems which enable managers to engage in CSR that benefits themselves at the expense of shareholders (Krueger, 2013). http://140.112.36.98:10080/uploads/asset/data/5bc8380a48b8a122f5000b36/macro_1071025.pdf

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WebThis is the Online Appendix for Cheng, Hong and Shue (2013) containing details of the model. ∗Dartmouth College, Tuck School of Business, email: ing … WebIssue Date September 2013. We find support for two key predictions of an agency theory of unproductive corporate social responsibility. First, increasing managerial ownership … free online search for marriage records

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WebFeb 1, 2015 · In fact, Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman (2012) provide causal evidence that less financially constrained firms tend to have better CSR performance, which is … Web\doing good with other people’s money" (Cheng, Hong, and Shue,2013). If the rms have a ... Kang, and Low(2013),Flammer(2015) andKruger (2015)). However, it is questionable whether these \halo e ects" that CSR generates dominate the opportunity costs imposed on rms when managers choose to focus on CSR rather than other projects. WebWe find support for two key predictions of an agency theory of unproductive corporate social responsibility. First, increasing managerial ownership decreases measures of firm … free online search for people